Recent controversies in neoclassical modelling and developments in Evidence-Driven Policy by Nettleton, SJ
Recent controversies in neoclassical modelling and 
developments in Evidence-Driven Policy
Stuart John Nettleton
Centre for Energy Policy Research, University of Technology, Sydney, PO Box 123, Broadway, NSW, 2007,  
Australia. Fax:+612 9514 2611; Tel: +612 9514 2000; E-mail: stuart.nettleton@uts.edu.au
Received 30th April 2010
The use of Computable General Equilibrium modelling in evidence-based policy requires 
an advanced policy making frame of reference, advanced understanding of neoclassical 
economics and advanced operations research capabilities. This paper examines 
developments in the policy making frame of reference. The process of evidence-driven 
policy places importance on the validation of potential policies using models. At national,  
bilateral and multilateral levels, policy analysis has increasingly relied on neoclassical  
computable general equilibrium models having substantial precedence. Bayesian analysis 
suggests that a policy which survives a validation test using such a model has a much better  
chance of being successful than a policy that fails such a test. Yet the 2008-9 Global 
Financial Crisis demonstrated that policies verified with neoclassical models neither 
predicted the Global Financial Crisis nor were able to address it. Governments across the 
world used massive Keynesian stimulus to restabilise economies. Neoclassical models 
became much maligned within Keynesian and behavioural economics circles. This paper 
investigates the continuing role of neoclassical models in evidence-driven policy with 
reference to the deductivism of Sir Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, inductivism and the 
controversial objective theory of evidence. While policy making has always been messy, in 
recent decades policy makers may have succumbed to the human fallibility of justifying 
pragmatism with simplified ideological paradigms that inappropriately place over-reliance 
on neoclassical free market mathematical models because these models are self-reinforcing 
of the ideology. It is suggested that future policy making will be even messier, with policy 
makers placing less importance on such simplified paradigms and taking more 
responsibility for managing plurality in the political process. It is concluded that 
neoclassical models will continue to have a role in testing policies but those features of 
neoclassical models that led to the failures in understanding the Global Financial Crisis  
will need to be addressed. For example, to be relevant such models will need to close for 
both households and investment and be cognisant of distributional effects such as the 
sweep of income to various classes of citizens through wage and taxation policies.
1. Introduction
Computable  General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  modelling  is  a  widely  used  policy  tool  in  the  
evidence  driven  policy  process.  This  paper  investigates  the  theoretical  underpinnings  of  
evidence driven policy through its unexpected successes and failures. Political economy and  
neoclassical economics are shown to provide the foundations of consistency for the use of  
CGE  tools  in  evidence  driven  policy  research.  The  findings  of  this  research  are  drawn  
This article is © Stuart Nettleton 2010  1
together in a comprehensive model for the evidence driven policy process.
2. Evidence Driven Policy
2.1 Evidence Driven Policy Controversy
Science seeks to explain natural laws and the working of the universe through testing theories  
in controlled experiments ceteris paribus. In contrast, economic and socio-technical problems 
are  huge,  holistic  and  often  pressing  issues  with  many feedback  loops  and  dependencies.  
Such  problems  are  at  the  core  of  the  fabric  of  society.  They  require  practical  solutions  
progressed through scenario models having mathematical precision, while at the same time  
guarding against  misplaced confidence in  apparently precise  numbers  and recognising that 
the results are merely the indicators of possible trends. Examples of relying on mathematical  
scenario  models  are  policies  to  deal  with  global  warming  and  re-engineering  the  world's  
financial systems post the 2009 Global Financial Crisis.
The  social  and  economic  aspects  of  policy  making  characterise  it  as  a  major  cross-
disciplinary area of policy and strategy.  Addressing the problem involves many disciplines  
such  as  macro  and  welfare  economics,  political  economy,  national,  business  and  industry  
strategies,  security  and  warfare  strategies,  finance,  valuation,  science,  technology  and 
engineering, operations research, game theory, philosophy, sociology and psychology.
A torment in global policy making is that many aspects are intensely ideological and subject  
to  overt  and  covert  national  and  business  strategies.  The  corrosiveness  of  this  mix  was  
demonstrated by the ignominious hiatus to the largest evidence driven policy research project  
ever undertaken. This was seventeen years of scientific climate research, economic evaluation  
and national and supra-national policy development following the 1992 Rio Earth Summit,  
which culminated in the fifteenth meeting of the United Nations Framework Convention on  
Climate Change Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC COP15) in Copenhagen.
The Copenhagen outcome put to flight the rationally deterministic assumption that evidence 
objectifies  the  policy making  process,  logical  policy conclusions  follow from a  tempered,  
measured and peer-reviewed process, and that influential people are impressed by the weight 
of evidence and a transparent and objective process.
Even the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which had so recently shared 
the  2007 Nobel  Peace  Prize  with  Al  Gore,  emerged  from Copenhagen  with  its  reputation  
impugned  through  ferocious  ideological  attacks.  Nevertheless,  ensuing  enquiries  into  its  
integrity and the verisimilitude of its evidence found little amiss. For example, Lord Oxburgh 
(2010), chair of the second of three public interest enquiries into claims of malpractice at the  
University  of  East  Anglia  Climate  Research  Unit  concluded  there  was  "absolutely  no 
evidence of any impropriety whatsoever" and "whatever was said in the [leaked] emails, the  
basic  science  seems to  have  been done  fairly and  properly."  (Adam 2010).  Lord  Oxburgh 
added that the assertions drawn from stolen emails appeared to be made by people "who do  
not  like  the  implications  of  some  the  [Climate  Research  Unit's]  conclusions."  A previous  
enquiry by the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee had similarly  
2 This article is © Stuart Nettleton 2010
found no wrongdoing by scientists at the Climate Research Unit. 
However,  a  recent  freedom  of  information  order  directing  Queen's  University  Belfast  to  
release  a  researcher's  40  years  of  dendrochronology data,  accumulated  using  his  personal 
expertise and involving specialised decision-making, threatens to change the established basis 
of  scientists'  intellectual  property  in  their  data  (UK  Information  Commissioner's  Office 
2010).
The public expects government to deal with long term issues. In the past, the policy makers  
have  usually  carried  out  their  tasks  through  stakeholder  discussion  and  an  incremental  
approach,  shunning  media  fanfare.  Unfortunately,  the  world's  media  has  proved  to  be  
unfamiliar  with  nature  of  evidence  driven  research  as  an  extension  of  the  traditional 
approach.  The  media  seized  on  the  transparency  of  the  process  as  providing  both  an 
opportunity for its role in giving public expressions to majority views, and as an unexpected 
smorgasbord  of  controversial  front-page  stories.  Rarely  did  the  media  demonstrate  an 
understanding of the nature of evidence driven policy and the fundamental characteristics of 
the process, for example, that social issues and some physical science relationships such as  
man-made or anthropogenic global warming cannot be proven one-hundred percent. Indeed,  
to do so would require at least two earths, one which we pollute with CO 2 and the other we 
keep pristine as a control. There is an unresolvable problem when the sample size is just one,  
which is a world that we all highly value.
Policy makers have long realised, as have legal courts, that there are few universal truths, all  
evidence  is  relative  and  probabilistic  and  that  the  concept  of  scientific  evidence  is  more 
synonymous  with  best  estimates  from  necessarily  circumstantial  evidence.  Nevertheless,  
fuelled by strong differences in views and vested interests, the media pursued its usual trial-
by-media  investigative  path  and  in  the  process  reported  with  equal  gravity  scientific, 
majority,  minority and extremist views. It even legitimised the views of cranks that had no  
scientific basis at all. This media noise resulted in the scientific and policy messages from the  
IPCC governments becoming extremely confused. Around the world, the public backed away 
from the issue.
Scientists  learnt  from  these  relentless  attacks.  For  example,  in  recently  releasing  climate 
measurements  from more  than  100  climate  reference  stations  around Australia,  Australia's  
CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology  (2010) declined to respond to media  questions outside 
those related to the methodology of their data or properly derived conclusions from the data.  
This steeling of scientists' resolve to deal only with facts and remain distinct from the domain  
of  policy  makers  heralds  a  new phase  where  policy  makers  will  need  to  face  the  media  
exposure of their evidence driven policy process, rather than those scientists and economists  
who provide the evidence and its interpretation.
While evidence driven policy “hit a wall” in Copenhagen, these ensuing events have shown 
that evidence based policy making at the level of the global commons has successful survived  
a severe stress tests. The magnitude of the global clash between ideology and vested interests  
on the one hand and the evidence based policy process  and science on the other has seen 
evidence based policy reborn through fire, much as the legendary phoenix.
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Firstly,  the scientific  evidence of anthropogenic  global  warming appears  to  have remained  
intact. Secondly, scientists themselves have become significantly more diligent, cautious and  
shrewd  in  dealing  with  ideological  and  vested  interest  view  points  and  with  the  media.  
Thirdly,  the  evidence  based  policy  process  continues  from  its  Copenhagen  hiatus  toward  
another  summit  at  the  UNFCCC's  November  2010 COP16 Mexico  meeting  in  the  city of 
Cancún.
Lastly, America has begun to address CO2 pollution in a bipartisan way. In late April 2010, 
John Kerry (D), Lindsey Graham (R) and Joe Lieberman (I) sponsored a revised Senate Bill  
for a 17% reduction on 2005 carbon emissions that is widely expected to be passed in the 
American summer because it accedes to Newt Gingrich's (R) quid pro quo demand for U.S. 
coastal oil drilling. While the Bill proposes a cap and trade scheme to place a price on carbon,  
President Barack Obama has commented that this may be changed to a carbon tax.
However many countries such as Australia and Germany have decided to await the outcome 
of  the  debate  on  this  Bill  before  moving  further  on  their  own  carbon  pricing  schemes.  
Australia's Greens Party had blocked the Government's Climate Pollution Reduction Scheme 
because it was unfairly generous to big polluters. On 30 December 2009, the Constitutional  
Court of France struck down President Nicolas Sarkozy's proposed carbon tax legislation for  
the  same  reason  (France24  2009).  In  his  April  2008  submission  to  the  Garnaut  Climate 
Change  Review,  Nettleton  (2010a,  Appendix  A1.1) recommended inter  alia that  Australia 
await the American decision for reasons that have come to fruition.
2.2 The Service Science of trust strategies in Evidence Driven Policy
Cochran & Malone (1995) define the essence of policy as: “Public policy consists of political  
decisions for implementing programs to achieve societal goals.” However, this statement is  
perhaps merely a description of public policy rather than a theory because although it can be  
used  to  explain  much,  in  fact  it  has  little  value  in  predicting  public  policy  outcomes  or  
development. Cochran et al. (1993) better captures the scale of the behavioural complexity in 
policy making “The term public policy always refers to the actions of government and the  
intentions that  determine those actions …. Public  policy is  the outcome of the struggle in  
government over who gets what.”
In  setting out  the basis  for  a  Service Science of  climate  change policy,  Nettleton  (2010b) 
shows that agreeing a set of policies to ameliorate threats to the global commons really means  
agreeing on a model of  how these policies will  work.  This  is  because such treaties are in  
effect  alliance  contracts  based  on  trust,  where  each  participant  shares  the  profits  and  
correspondingly shares the losses.  Unfortunately,  as  countries are  well  aware,  immediately  
after an alliance contract is entered into, the conditions that applied at the time will change.  
Through  elections,  governments  will  change,  wars  will  begin,  countries  will  suffer 
unpredictable  earthquakes  and  tsunamis,  and  the  effect  of  the  contract  will  work  out  
differently than envisaged. Cultural differences will play a big part. For example, in China a  
contract  is  mainly  a  statement  of  intentions  at  the  time  and  often  disregarded  if  new 
circumstances arise or new market opportunities or alliances present themselves.
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As an alliance contract, a climate change treaty needs to be sufficiently flexible to cope with  
these changes. The people administering the alliance contract need to be able to reappraise 
changing situations and find other ways to achieve a win-win outcome for all stakeholders.  
This is not so easy to do when various countries are proceeding to change their institutions on  
the basis of previous commitments and arrangements.
Policy makers  use  many techniques  in  the  democratic  process  of  shaping  policy  amongst 
stakeholders. These include evidence-based policy, “dialogic” policy development (multiple  
ongoing  stakeholder  dialogue)  and  Lindbloom's  (1959) incrementalism  or  “muddling 
through” alternative to the rationalist model.
Keane  (2009) had  discerned  a  trend  towards  “monitored  democracies,”  similar  to  India, 
where  government  decisions  will  be  increasingly  monitored  by  many  non-governmental 
organisations. Indeed, Blond  (2009) argues that the civil state will be the next evolution of 
British society,  building on the strengths and overcoming failures of both the welfare state  
and the market state.
In an early 1990s example of this trend, Prime Minister Tony Blair sought to reform United  
Kingdom government  policy and corporate governance with evidence-based policy  (United 
Kingdom Cabinet Office 1999; UK Hampel Committee 1998). Although some would argue 
that  Tony  Blair's  own  Prime  Minister's  office  did  not  provide  a  very  good  example  of 
transparency  and evidence-based analysis,  the underlying virtuous assumption of evidence-
based policy remains undisputed: better policy is achieved with research and evidence that  
better policy produces better outcomes.  In  contrast,  poor policy usually wastes money and  
fails to achieve its aims.
2.2 Open and closed institutional philosophies
A debate between Sir Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn demonstrates an important dimension of 
evidence driven policy decisions, which is the difference between processes in open evidence  
based groups and closed establishment groups. This debate was sponsored by Imre Lakatos as  
part  of  the  International  Colloquium in  the  Philosophy of  Science  at  the  former  Bedford  
College, University of London on 13 July 1965 (Fuller 2003, p.10). Five years later, Lakatos 
(1970) wrote of Popper and Kuhn's diametrically opposed views “The clash between Popper  
and  Kuhn  is  not  about  a  mere  technical  point  in  epistemology.  It  concerns  our  central 
intellectual  values,  and  has  implications  not  only  for  theoretical  physics  but  also  for  the 
underdeveloped social sciences and even moral and political philosophy.”
Although both great  deductivists  subscribed to  the process  of  deduction as  being the  way 
forward in science, each had a different view of how this occurred. Thomas Kuhn had shown 
in  The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions (1962) that  the  attitude  to  science  in  cold-war 
America was one of protecting the orthodox paradigm from all challenges. This meant that 
advances occurred in waves rather than linearly. People who wanted to prosper in their career  
were  best  advised  to  keep  their  heads-down.  It  could  take  a  decade  or  even  generational 
change for a new paradigm to become accepted in the scientific community.
Fuller (2003, p.102) notes that Popper found Kuhn's heads-down model abhorrent although,  
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in  the  1965 debate,  Popper  readily accepted that  Kuhn's  approach best  described the way 
organisations operated and how science advanced in waves. Nevertheless, he thought it to be  
an  inferior  system that  should  be  replaced  by the  open  methodology of  critical  thinking,  
passionately providing new ideas for peer review, receiving in return positive criticism and 
seeking to winnow the set  of theories through proactive falsification.  Furthermore,  Popper  
claimed that new ideas may die but the careers of the people who have them should not as  
was found in Kuhn's empirical research. Indeed, Popper suggested that an individual is to be  
even  more  respected  for  learning  and  moving  on  to  new and  hopefully  more  sustainable  
theories.
Popper  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  first  existentialists  in  science  and  was  knighted  for  his  
liberalist,  rational  and  anti-authoritarian  values  and his  concept  of  advancing science.  His  
main theory of falsification is set out in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), originally 
published in German in 1934 and translated into English by Popper himself in 1959. Popper 
maintained  that  the  best  theory  is  the  one  that  has  withstood  the  greatest  number  of  
falsification  attempts.  He  treats  falsification  as  the  cornerstone  of  the  scientific  ethic  and 
challenges scientists  to  test  their  theories  by simultaneously making predictions and using 
their greatest powers of logic to formulate empirical tests that actively seek to falsify their  
own theories.
Following  Bergson  (1932),  Popper  uses  the  term  open  society  to  describe  a  classical 
democracy that is predicated on transparency, debate, accountability and the testing of ideas  
(Popper 1945). This is very close to an ideal way for a society to advance through evidence  
driven policy.
While we would like society and its institutions to be completely rational, and we know that  
the closer we approach this ideal state the better, unfortunately, as Kuhn found, the reality of  
traditional policy making is that it does not approach this ideal at all.  Far from submitting  
theories  to  falsification,  scientific  institutions  go  to  extraordinary  lengths  to  defend  their  
theories against falsification. Also, in the real world the number of confirmations of success 
is  often regarded as more important than the number of times a theory has failed or even  
survived falsification. For example, an Australian Court of Law will accept widely used rules  
of thumb as compelling evidence.
Popper's  concept  of  falsification  has  itself  been  criticised  as  a  non-falsifiable  hypothesis  
because it cannot be verified through testing. O'Hear (1989) argued that the falsification tests 
are themselves just  theories,  so they cannot be true tests of another theory.  Curd & Cover  
(1998) explain the Quine-Duhem Thesis (Duhem 1906) that it's impossible to isolate a single 
theory for testing from the environment of theories that surround it. So if a cluster of theories  
is falsified it is not possible to identify the defective element.
Even more broadly, deductivism is itself a hypothesis that cannot be accorded the status of a  
theory because any proof of deductivism is  inconsistent  if  it  relies on any axiom or proof  
established  using  deductivist  principles.  Therefore  deductivism  is  caught  by  the  ultimate  
paradox that a consistent set of rules cannot establish the validity of that same set of rules.  
This paradox is illustrated by Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems in Mathematics. These  
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incompleteness theorems prove that it  is  not possible to find a formal  theory (i.e.  a set  of  
axioms) that can prove all theories and exclude all falsehoods; and that if a formal theory can  
be  proven  consistent  from  within  itself,  then  it  must  rely  upon  itself  and  therefore  be  
inconsistent (Gödel 1931, Theorems VI & XI).
Despite these vulnerabilities, both deductivism and falsification are widely regarded as useful  
and  powerful  formulations  for  rational  scientific  enquiry.  Ironically,  these  hypotheses  are 
saved  by Kuhn's  finding that  an  organisation  (or  theory)  is  not  broken  just  because  some 
things  inside  it  are  broken.  Therefore,  the  deductivist  paradigm is  not  broken  merely  on 
account  that  it  is  unable to  self-establish.  Perhaps Popper  would not  be unhappy with this  
outcome because to do so would have many unreasonable consequences.  For example,  the  
identity “1 + 1 = 2” is well accepted as part of the body of common knowledge that every 
child  learns  at  school.  Indeed,  if  the  child  does not  know this  rule  then  either  the  child's  
learning or the school's teaching would be considered grossly deficient. Nevertheless, Gödel's  
incompleteness  theorems  declares  that  this  fundamental  identity  is  unprovable  and,  by 
extension, render as flawed the whole set of proofs, tests and practices that depend upon it.
Even  though deductivism and falsification cannot  be proven,  it  is  surprising that  Popper's  
theory  remains  controversial  today  as  the  ideal  of  falsification  has  an  essential  place  in  
science and the technique of criticism has always been used in  academic peer review.  For  
example,  there  are  famous  experiments  where  deductivists  have  developed  tests  of  a  
hypothesis,  such  as  testing  Einstein's  theories  that  light  bends  and  space-time  curves.  In  
addition, since 2000, falsification became the fundamental principle for the way software is  
developed. In test driven development, tests are written before the application code is started  
and then only sufficient software code to pass the test is actually prepared.
However  it  has  proven extremely hard in  general  practice  to  progress  science and society 
through  a  rigid  deductivist  discipline  of  public  criticism  and  falsification.  For  example,  
modern political  systems are not able to function by hypothesis falsification.  Blaug  (1992) 
has pointed out that economic paradigms such as neoclassical economics cannot be subjected 
to  Popperian  falsification  because  a  controlled  experiment  in  human  behaviour  cannot  be 
performed  with  the  holding  of  other  factors  constant.  It  has  already been  mentioned  that 
global warming cannot be tested ceteris paribus.
Many issues  dominate  politics.  Neither  politicians  nor  the  bureaucracy  like  to  encourage 
negative criticism,  even if  rationality is  identified with the virtues  of public  criticism and  
falsification testing. Unfortunately, people are not purely rational beings. They have emotions  
and  much  self-esteem  and  “will  to  power”  invested  in  certain  structures  and  theories.  
Therefore  people  often  respond  to  falsification  criticism  with  a  range  of  emotions  from 
dismay to aggression. Pragmatism, realism, working trade-offs and sub-optimisation are the  
norm rather than exception. Indeed, the working assumptions of the bureaucracy are rarely, if  
ever, examined. This is the reality of the messy social milieu for public policy formation. 
Instead,  the  policy  making  process  in  democratic  societies  has  traditionally  been  for 
politicians to allow public opinion to drift towards a position that the politicians desire, which  
is then given repeated exposure. Those in a position to know the real situation, the scientists,  
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journalists  and  bureaucrats  rarely  publicise  their  views  because  of  the  risk  of  career 
victimisation. This is what Popper called the “spiral of silence”. It is the very reason why the  
media was originally conceived as a fourth estate, in order to represent the third estate (the 
people) and give public expression to majority views rather than assume these to be simply  
self-evident.
Advancing  societies  through  rigid  deductive  policy making  appears  to  be  an  unattainable 
perfection, especially when the dichotomy between open and closed institutions provides a 
continuing tension in all  societies.  As the Periclean democracy of Athens proved to be too 
pure in its principles to stand the test of time against powerful elites, so Popper's open society 
is considered by the institutions of society to be insufficiently stable for social cohesion.
Nevertheless,  it  appears  to  remain  a  valid  hypothesis  that  the  closer  falsification  can  be  
approached  and  transparency  is  valued  in  the  policy making  process,  the  more  open  and 
successful economies and business will  be. Thus organisations and countries that strive for  
open principles will  not just  demonstrate their ethical commitment but maximise economic 
welfare in their society by providing the conditions of transparency and trust in which people  
can make their greatest achievements.
2.3. The Objective Theory of Evidence
Influential deductivists such as Sir Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn would never agree that a  
clinical trial is sufficient to be sure that a drug will cure the next person tested. Popper's oft-
quoted example is that no matter how many white swans are observed, an absolute theory that 
all swans are white is never justified (Magee 1974, p.22). However, Popper would agree that 
the more tests a drug withstands without failure then the more robust is the hypothesis of its  
efficacy.
To  Popper's  chagrin,  instead  of  working  through  deduction,  society  tends  to  work  by 
induction.  This  is  the  evidence  driven  process  to  infer  generalisations  from  specific 
observations by drawing upon bodies  of well  specified knowledge,  the normative working  
hypotheses  that  form  part  of  professional  systematic  practice  and  through  human  pattern  
recognition, intuition and creativity. This creative process is not uncontrolled but subject to 
various measures of quality assurance such as peer and judicial review. The requirement for 
coherence and believability of  any form of  induction is  the same as  proving a  hypothesis  
beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law. In this tradition, policy makers approach issues as  
a “historian who sees common tendencies in certain contexts, not a philosopher who seeks  
clear general principles that apply across contexts” (Brooks 2009).
Evidence-driven techniques place a high value on evidence being consistent and rational in  
order  for  confidence  to  develop  in  the  hypothesis.  Historical  analysis  is  an  exceedingly 
important  part  of  establishing  consistency  because  every  time  an  additional  observation 
seems to confirm a theory, the more believable the result becomes.
For  example,  the  scientific  method  has  been  exceptionally  successful  in  validating  drugs 
through clinical trials. Leonhardt  (2009) observes that policy makers and doctors alike have 
become  perplexed  by  the  plethora  of  treatments  available  and  the  lobbying  of  drug 
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companies, device makers, insurers, doctors and hospitals. He notes America's transition to  
evidence based care where doctors and policy makers, working together and across precedent  
of circumstances with many nuances, are taking the next step of identifying the best treatment  
practices among all the alternatives using induction and less than perfect information.
Evidence driven processes that rely on inter-subjectivity are part of the domain of “objective  
theory of  evidence.”  Even  the name is  somewhat  controversial  because each of  the words  
“objective,”  “theory”  and  “evidence”  have  always  galvanised  a  challenge  from  one  
philosophical  persuasion or another.  For  example,  how could something be simultaneously 
objective  and  subjective,  or  be  a  theory when it  is  really  an  untestable  hypothesis,  or  be  
evidence when it is really an observation or estimate?
The word “objective” in the title comes from Popper (1972), who proposed that a “World III” 
of  objective  knowledge  be  recognised  as  a  third  dimension  of  existence  following  the  
objective  and  the  subjective.  This  would  comprise  statute  and  common  laws,  scientific  
papers,  textbooks,  documented  procedures  etc.  While  both  Popper's  “World  III”  and  the 
“objective theory of evidence” remain controversial in philosophical circles, these ideas have 
had a profound influence on normative theories for practical professional practise.
Unfortunately,  Popper's  World  III  received  the  same  cold  shoulder  as  had  his  theory  of  
falsification.  Few  were  prepared  to  admit  the  existence  of  knowledge  and  institutional 
structures  (for  example  laws  and  the  police  force)  that  are  independent  of  the  knowing  
subject. Perhaps this is because Popper's World III disrupts the simple Cartesian dualism of  
mind and body.
The “objective theory of evidence” relies on two primary concepts. The first is that true and  
false are not absolute states. In  A Treatise on Probability Keynes  (1921, Chapters 15 & 17) 
hypothesised a continuum between falsity and truth. He suggested that intermediate points in  
this  interval  are  associated  with  probabilities  of  truth.  The  legal  system  accepts  his 
proposition,  for  example,  requiring guilt  to  be proven  beyond reasonable  doubt  in  serious 
cases and on the balance of probabilities in less serious cases.
The second concept  in  the objective theory of  evidence is  associated with  Thomas Bayes' 
theorem  of  conditional  probability.  This  theory  of  inductive  inference  provides  the  
mathematics behind Popper's World III and the objective theory of evidence.
2.4 Bayesian analysis
Bayes' theorem states that the probability that a hypothesis is true at a point in time, given 
certain evidence, is the probability of the past evidence occurring when the hypothesis was 
true, multiplied by the probability of the hypothesis being true in any case and divided by the 
probability of the evidence occurring in any case.
Evidence based processes are prima facie subjective Bayesian inductive inference due to the 
subjective  assignment  of  prior  probabilities.  However,  the  “objective  theory  of  evidence” 
holds  that  these  processes  have  the  nature  of  an  “objective  theory”  because  professional 
researchers  have  a  concern  for  objectivity  and  independence  in  their  work,  such  as 
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undertaking  professional  error-statistical  practices  as  part  of  their  methodologies  (Mayo 
1996;  Mayo  &  Spanos  2004;  Staley  &  Cobb  2009);  peer  reviewers  introduce  an  inter-
subjective  due  diligence  layer  because  their  concern  for  truth  means  that  research 
assumptions  and  results  are  subjected  to  informed  criticism  and  repeatability  testing 
(Achinstein  1991;  2001;  Rehg  &  Staley  2008);  and  Bayesian  inference  conforms  to  the 
“likelihood principle” because it merely depends on prior probabilities, which have nothing  
to do with the experiment (Birnbaum 1962, p. 271; Sprenger 2008, pp 197 & 204). Therefore, 
the  results  emerging  from a process  that  applies  the  scientific  method  are  qualified  to  be  
considered as part of an independent body of knowledge (which is Popper's World III).
Although Birnbaum's “likelihood principle” is highly regarded, it also remains controversial.  
It is stated as follows,  The likelihood principle (L): “In an experiment E  with observed data 
x, all experimental information about  v is contained in the likelihood function v->P(x|v). All 
other information can be neglected. More precisely, if E and E' are two experiments and if the 
outcomes  x and  x' generate the same likelihood function, then Ev(E,x)  = Ev(E',x'),  without 
reference to the structure of E and E'” Its corollary is that the probability of results that could 
have  been  observed  is  irrelevant  to  the  statistical  inference.  The  “Likelihood  Principle” 
contains the principles of sufficiency (S) and conditionality (C). Birnbaum notes: “The fact  
that relatively few statisticians have accepted (L) as appropriate for purposes of informative  
inference, while many are inclined to accept (S) and (C), lend interest and significance to the  
result,  provided  herein,  that  (S)  and  (C)  together  are  mathematically  equivalent  to  (L)“ 
(Birnbaum 1962, p. 271).
Bayes'  theory of  conditional  probability  demonstrates  the  reason  why policy makers  seek 
confirmation from economic modellers that a particular policy represents a scenario that is at  
least feasible. For the purpose of example, it is assumed that economic modelling has a 90% 
probability of correctly showing a particular policy is feasible,  if indeed it  is  feasible,  and  
that  say 60% of  all  proposed  policies  are  feasible.  Therefore  the  probability  of  economic  
modelling identifying that policies are feasible, notwithstanding whether the policy is or is 
not feasible, is 58%.‡1. Furthermore, the Bayesian probability that a policy is feasible given  
that modelling shows that it is feasible, is a more impressive 93%.‡2.
The  power  of  this  point  may  be  clearly  understood  in  terms  of  natural  frequencies 
(Gigerenzer  2003,  Chapter  4).  For  example,  if  60  out  of  100  polices  are  feasible  then 
economic modelling will  on average show 90% or 54 to be feasible.  Of the remaining 40  
policies that are unfeasible in the original group of 100 policies, 10% or 4 will be incorrectly  
shown to be feasible. Therefore, a total of 58 will be shown to be feasible although of these  
only 54 or 93% will indeed be feasible.
This  example  of  applying  consistent  normative  practice  in  policy  modelling  shows  that  
feasibility testing has improved a policy maker's chances of a feasible policy from 60 in 100  
(60%)  to  54  in  58  (93%).  However,  this  analysis  also  cautions  that  this  powerful  
demonstration of normative practice is not infallible. Using the above example, 4 unfeasible  
polices  were  shown  to  be  feasible  and,  in  addition,  6  policies  of  the  original  60  that  are  
indeed feasible were classed as unfeasible.
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The above  example  is  rather  static  in  that  it  assumes  the  economic  policy modeller  to  be  
merely  “running  a  standard  test”  to  check  feasibility.  However,  policy  modellers  are  not  
outside the test. Instead they are inside the test and influence it as active intuitive beings, on  
the  one  hand  working  incrementally  with  sensitivities  but  on  the  other  hand  recognising 
patterns  and experimentally reengineering the whole structure  of the policy based on their  
modelling  insights  from this  and  other  projects  and research.  In  addition,  modellers  bring  
their own specialised competences,  for example,  in Coasian markets or Hick's  productivity  
assumptions  (Coase  1960;  Hicks  1932).  Lastly,  policy  modellers'  normative  practice  is 
independently advancing  through  policy review and  learning  activities  such  as  continuing 
professional development. Where policy modellers can reliably discriminate between policies  
and  help  to  reengineer  a  better  policy  then  the  corresponding  “value  added”  of  their  
normative professional practice is significantly greater.
2.5 Political viewpoints
Conservative and liberal political views dominate the current political environment. Usually,  
politicians  of  each  persuasion  cooperate  in  forming  bipartisan  approaches  to  lawmaking.  
However, in recent years an extreme polarity has developed between these two viewpoints.  
This exacerbated lack of cooperation has been dubbed hyperpartisanship.  It  has also led to  
new ultra-ideological groups, such as the Tea Party movement in America.
There is bound to be division when a concept emerges from one of the political persuasions,  
such as evidence driven policy has emerged from political liberal attitudes of transparency 
and equity. The discipline of moral psychology was established by Lawrence Kohlberg (1969) 
to  understand  the  difference  between  conservative  and  liberal  attitudes.  An  insightful  
behavioural model has been contributed by Haidt & Graham (2007). This model suggests that 
five underlying psychological factors characterise emotional reactions in politics. These are  
harm-care,  fairness-reciprocity,  ingroup-loyalty  (i.e.  protect  the  group  or  traditions),  
authority-respect, and purity-sanctity (i.e. religion).
According to Jonathan Haidt's model, people's default attitude is political conservatism with 
conservatives  being  broadly  pluralist  and  eclectic  across  these  five  factors.  Political  
liberalism exists in nations where the social milieu permits a sort of switching off of the last  
three dimensions of conservatism. This leaves the moral intuitions of political liberals mainly 
or even solely based on the factors of harm-care and fairness-reciprocity.
Stephen Clarke (Saunders 2009) explains the authority-respect factor is particularly pervasive 
with political conservatives. For example, many Americans who endorsed President George  
W. Bush did so primarily because they believed he upheld morality. Haidt suggests that the 
strength of the respect-authority factor leads political conservatives to see no inconsistency in 
decisions  being  executed  with  summary  justice  and  implemented  expediently.  This  is  of 
course  the  antithesis  of  a  liberal  desire  for  a  transparent,  evidence  driven  process  where  
decisions are made with input from all the stakeholders to ensure fairness and minimise harm.
Leon  Kass  (1997) explains  why conservatives  take  this  approach  to  decision  making.  He 
argues that political conservatives rely on their gut feel for moral principles and identify any  
violation  as  repugnant  and,  by extension,  a  pernicious  threat  to  the  establishment.  This  is  
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Kass' well know “yuck factor.” Abortion, euthanasia and gay marriage are but a few of the 
issues repugnant to political conservatives on the hard right. By further extension, individuals  
involved with a  violation of the moral  principles  are  characterised as  foul  and sub-social,  
deserving of no rights. In addition, political conservatives see no need to explicitly articulate  
their intuition and prejudices. Haidt notes that conservatives will often change the subject to  
avoid  explaining  the  basis  of  their  views.  Debate  is  also  minimised  by  appealing  to  the  
purity-sancity factor in a way that might seem superstitious to a liberal.
The  authoritarian-respect  and  in-group-loyalty  factors  have  sometimes  led  to  a  kind  of  
governmental  psychopathy,  which  has  provided  plots  for  many  Hollywood  movies. 
Sometimes  this  governmental  psychopathy  is  exhibited  in  national  policy,  for  example, 
governments  spying  on  their  own  citizens,  imprisonment  without  charge,  suspension  of  
habeas corpus, kidnapping and rendition, political assassination, torture and public deception.
Is a moot point as to whether the government acts psychopathically or certain psychopathic  
people dominate government policy. The latter are called “office psychopaths” to distinguish 
them from serial killers and the like (Clarke 2005).
Unfortunately  for  conservative  politics,  Haidt's  five  factors  create  a  fertile  atmosphere  in  
which organisational psychopaths may thrive. This is because the awry delamination of the  
conservative  paradigm  into  its  various  psychopathic  states,  for  example  bullying  and 
victimisation, is hard to detect because the overtly conservative cloak of an office psychopath  
is  a  very  effective  disguise.  Indeed,  initially  the  aberrant  behaviour  seems  to  be  that  of  
fervent,  evangelical  conservative.  The  difficulty  in  ferreting  out  office  psychopaths  is  
compounded by the multi-agent predator strategies that they employ to amplify their tactics  
(Axelrod 1984).
Whilst democracies (and corporations) ultimately recognise psychopathic behaviour for what  
it  is,  in  the very existence of organisational  psychopaths there  is  a  classic  case of  drama.  
Society suffers a permanent loss, even of things as important as its reputation. Everyone with  
whom an organisational psychopath comes in contact with has lost whether they know it or  
not. A particular victim is the company or country that mistakenly supports the organisational  
psychopath.
In  contrast  to  the  attitudes  of  political  conservatives,  political  liberals  call  for  freedom,  
autonomy and the right of individuals to express their own preferences. In decision making,  
political  liberals  seek  principles  of  equality,  natural  justice,  rational  accountability  and  
transparent,  evidence  based  debate.  They  do  not  bundle  moral  values  such  as  loyalty,  
authority and sanctity into decision making  processes  such  as  evidence  driven  policy.  For 
example,  Clarke  (Saunders 2009) explains  of Haidt's  ingroup-loyalty factor:  “Conservative 
morality is the default  morality that occurs  in most  parts of the world …. so most  people  
consider  patriotism to be a moral virtue,  but  a  liberal  will  not  consider patriotism to be a  
moral virtue; they might concede it to be an interesting character trait, but they don't consider  
it to be a natural morality.”
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2.6 Western conservative beliefs and the cusp of change in accepting global resource 
constraints
In  reviewing  the  failure  of  the  1992  Rio  Earth  Summit,  German  Finance  Minister  Klaus 
Topfer noted “I am afraid that conservatives in the United States are picking 'ecologism' as  
their  new enemy”  (Greenhouse  1992).  Subsequent  events  bore  out  Topfer's  prediction  of 
intense conservative opposition to global  warming.  As noted at  the start  of this paper,  this  
included  attacks  on  environmental  scientists,  whom  they  believed  to  be  aligned  with  an  
existential threat to American sovereignty and unilateralism.
American  and  Australian  conservative  attitudes  are  starkly  at  odds  with  those  of  their  
European  counterparts.  Whereas  American  conservatives  have  to  date  equated  the right  to  
pollute  the  atmosphere  with  individualism  and  free  markets,  conservative  European 
governments  see  no  inconsistency  between  dealing  with  global  warming  and  their  
conservative values (Conason 2009). 
The  strength  and  resilience  of  conservative  political  opposition  was  the  main  reason  that  
President Barack Obama was unable to marshal  U.S.  Senate support to re-engage with the  
world on major issues such as greenhouse gas pollution. The U.S. Senate sees itself as the  
proud  defender  of  American  unilateralism  and  has  a  history  of  not  supporting  any 
international treaty that constrains America. The U.S. Senate's filibustering of global climate  
change policy led to an impotence in American policy at the UNFCCC's COP15 meeting in 
Copenhagen and,  as discussed at  the start  of this paper,  to a hiatus in the largest evidence 
driven policy project ever undertaken.
Yale historian, Paul Kennedy (1993) observed that those people who succeed in democratic  
political systems usually do so by managing to avoid antagonising powerful interest groups.  
President  Barack  Obama  has  apparently  been  aware  of  this  issue  and  sought  to  bridge 
enormous ideological schisms in policies for the Global Financial Crisis and Health Care. Yet  
it  remains  to  be  seen if  the broad base of  Americans  will  be  capable  of  accepting a  new  
humility of sustainable living where unilateral action to secure energy resources has become 
an international crime and perhaps, in future, a punishable war crime (Kelly 2010).
3. The Neoclassical Paradigm
3.1 The central role of the Neoclassical paradigm
Classical  economics  has  underpinned  Western  social  and  economic  development  for  two 
hundred years. Many aspects of the core value system of Western free market democracies  
are  embodied  in  classical  economics'  mathematical  sibling,  neoclassical  economics.  The  
neoclassical paradigm derives two major strengths from its inextricable links to democracy 
and capitalism. The first is that the paradigm is internally consistent with independence and  
unregulated markets  and the second is that society has  been modified to  fit  the  paradigm.  
Therefore,  the  neoclassical  paradigm  parallels  the  workings  of  Western  market  societies,  
except in exceptional circumstances.
Challenges from Karl  Marx  (1867),  John Maynard  Keynes  (1936) and John Rawls  (1972) 
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have served to strengthen the core values of the paradigm rather than weaken it.  Indeed, a  
dramatic reversal of Marx's theory has occurred in recent decades. A declining labour share of  
GDP  and  sweep  of  income  to  the  most  wealthy  show  that  the  owners  of  capital  have  
prospered to a far greater degree than the owners of labour (Herbst 2009).
Even proudly egalitarian nations such as Australia have seen inequality strongly rising in the  
same period for the same reasons. As shown in the Figure 1, Australian companies enjoy a  
very  high  and  rapidly growing  share  of  factor  income.  As  a  result,  they  are  able  to  pay  
considerably higher dividends than companies in the rest of the world. Figure 2 shows that 
this has resulted in the labour share of factor income falling steadily over the last 30 years.  
This has been exacerbated by the compulsory alienation of individual incomes for retirement 
superannuation contributions.
Fig 1. Australian Profit share of Factor Income 
(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 5206.0 
Australian National Accounts: National Income, 
Expenditure and Product, Table 7. Income from 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Current prices)
Fig 2. Australian Labour share of Factor Income, 
before (blue) and net of (purple) superannuation 
(Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics 5206.0 
Australian National Accounts: National Income, 
Expenditure and Product, Table 7. Income from 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Current prices)
As in America, the depression of labour share of income has been accompanied by a sweep of  
income to the top 1% as shown in Figure 3  (Atkinson & Leigh 2006). There could only be 
one result from the pressure on labour share and sweep of income to the most wealthy. Easy 
money  coupled  with  these  financial  pressures  led  to  recurrent  living  expenditure  being  
financed from debt. Figure 4 shows that Australian average private debt to income has risen 
four-fold from 40% in 1980 to 160% in 2008.
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Fig 3. Top 1% share of Australian Income (Source: 
Atkinson & Leigh 2006, Appendix 6, Table 1, 
updated to 2007 at andrewleigh.com/?p=2533)
Fig 4. Australian average private debt to income 
(Source: Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical 
Bulletin B21 Household Finances Selected Ratios)
Indeed, American and Australian governments and reserve banks had begun to believe that it  
was  normal  for  ordinary  people  to  finance  their  current  expenditure  by  debt  rather  than 
income. Although many people scratched their heads over what they knew was a delusion, the  
system seemed to be sustainable.  That  is,  until  the  it  collapsed in  the American 2008 sub  
prime crisis.  Failure  to  close  policy and  CGE models  for  households  and  socio-economic  
groups was the reason that neoclassical economics was unable to predict or find a way out of  
the  Global  Financial  Crisis.  This  failure  of  neoclassical  economics  once  again  led  to  it  
suffering  the  indignity  of  emergency  Keynesian  triage.  Banking  excesses  were  merely 
runaway symptoms of problems whose sources lay with the policy makers not insisting on 
intertemporal debt neutrality and failing to close their policies and models for households.
The Global  Financial  Crisis  reignited  the controversy between Keynesian and neoclassical 
economics.  Implicit  in  Keynes'  theories  were  two  key  arguments  that  upset  the  classical  
approach.  The  first  was  that  the  simplicity  of  classical  economics  could  not  cope  with  
economic cycles. The second was that an almost total lack of government business regulation  
through the 1920s directly contributed to the excesses  of the decade,  the 1929 Wall Street  
crash and the ensuing Depression. At that time, as in 2009, many people lost confidence in 
the ability of classical  and neoclassical economics to predict  or to  fix the market  failures.  
Other  notable  successes  of  economic  stimulus  that  Keynesians  point  to  are  the  rebuilding 
Western Europe and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s.
3.2 Challenges to the legitimacy of neoclassical economics
Over the last  80 years,  it  seems that  neoclassical  economists  have  led the world into two  
serious economic collapses.  Many economists  have asked if  rational frameworks of policy 
testing  and  analysis  are  seriously  flawed.  Mark  Dodgson  & Eric  Beinhocker  criticise  the  
fundamental  assumption  of  rationality  in  neoclassical  models  “The  intellectual  field  of 
economics  is  on  the  cusp  of  a  big  transformation.  Mainstream economics  is  increasingly  
being  seen  to  be  detached  from  reality.  Its  assumptions  about  equilibrium,  rationality  in 
human behaviour  and the primacy of  market  forces  that  are  mysteriously asocial  make its  
predictive  power  extremely  limited  ....  The  discipline  is  suffering,  in  effect,  from  the  
challenge to neoliberal economic doctrine brought on by the [2008-9] sub-prime crisis in the 
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U.S. and its repercussions across the global financial  system. Feeding the mood of despair  
across financial markets is the perception that mainstream economics was unable to predict  
the crisis, or to manage it, and has been intellectually enfeebled by the Gordian knot of peak  
energy prices, planetary overheating and global debt” (Slattery 2008).
The  financial  crisis  has  also  led  to  sharply  divided  opinions  between  New  York  Times  
columnists  David Brooks,  a  classical  and behavioural economist,  and Nobel Laureate Paul  
Krugman, a Keynesian economist. Brooks laments that neoclassical models are overly linear  
and  rational,  lacking  psychological  dimensions.  He  writes  “Economic  models  and  entire 
social science disciplines are premised on the assumption that people are mostly engaged in 
rationally calculating and maximizing their self-interest …. But during this financial crisis,  
that way of thinking has failed spectacularly. As Alan Greenspan noted in his Congressional 
testimony last  week,  he was “shocked” that  markets  did not  work as anticipated”  (Brooks 
2008).
Brooks  continues  his  criticism  of  neoclassical  economics  “Once,  classical  economics  
dominated policy thinking.  The classical models presumed a certain sort  of orderly human  
makeup …. the market rewards rational behavior …. The invisible hand forms a spontaneous, 
dynamic order .... Economic behavior can be accurately predicted through elegant models ….  
This view explains a lot, but not the current financial crisis — how so many people could be  
so stupid, incompetent and self-destructive all at once ….  This crisis represents a flaw in the 
classical economic model and its belief in efficient markets …. Democratic discussions of the  
stimulus package also rest on a mechanical, dehumanized view of the economy. You pump in 
a certain amount of money and “the economy” spits out a certain number of jobs …. But an  
economy  is  a  society  of  trust  and  faith  ....  The  economic  spirit  of  a  people  cannot  be 
manipulated  in  as  simple-minded  a  fashion  as  the  Keynesian  mechanists  imagine  …. 
Mechanistic thinkers on the right and left pose as rigorous empiricists. But empiricism built  
on an inaccurate view of human nature is just a prison” (Brooks 2009).
While  Brooks  has  slowly moderated  his  criticism of  the  Keynesian  stimulus  package,  his  
expression of public frustration with existing economic approaches is nevertheless poignant.  
The most important of these is that models based on consumption growth as society's main 
goal do not react well in low or volatile growth situations.
Although a Keynesian, Krugman (2009) agrees that the issue with neoclassical models is that 
they address steady state growth, and do not respond to the rapid dynamics of the economy.  
Therefore,  the problem with neoclassical views of the world lies less with the models  and 
more with policy makers' preoccupation with steady state growth. Perhaps it would be more 
accurate to note that the mutually reinforcing paradigms of Western free market democracies  
and neoclassical economic models, together with a long period of post-WWII prosperity have  
lulled Western politicians and policy makers into the reassurance that a focus on growth is a  
stable single indicator of economic welfare.
This does not imply that policy makers are unidimensional. Indeed, quite the reverse. It may  
be recalled from the earlier discussion that policy makers would prefer that economic models  
are always completely correct. However, policy makers seek confirmation of feasibility from 
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modellers  to  improve  the  probability  that  their  policy  will  be  feasible,  not  seer-like 
predictions of the future and iron-clad guarantees of policy outcomes. Policy makers are well  
aware that the future will unfold quite differently to that forecast in economic models. This is  
why  policy  makers  chuckle  in  good  humour  at  John  Kenneth  Galbraith's  quip  that  
“economists were invented to give fortune tellers a good name.”
Krugman notes  that  “the more it  changes,  the more it  stays  the same” because only those  
seeking deterministic mathematical solutions have lost.  He concludes that policy formation  
will  always  be  messy  rather  than  neat  and  mathematical  “As  I  see  it,  the  economics 
profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty,  clad in impressive-
looking mathematics, for truth …. Until  the Great Depression,  most economists clung to a  
vision of capitalism as a perfect or nearly perfect system. That vision wasn’t sustainable in  
the face of mass unemployment, but as memories of the Depression faded,  economists fell  
back  in  love  with  the  old,  idealized  vision  of  an  economy in  which  rational  individuals  
interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations …. It’s much harder to  
say  where  the  economics  profession  goes  from  here.  But  what’s  almost  certain  is  that  
economists will have to learn to live with messiness …. In practical terms, this will translate  
into  more  cautious  policy  advice  —  and  a  reduced  willingness  to  dismantle  economic 
safeguards in the faith that markets will solve all problems …. flaws-and-frictions economics 
will move from the periphery of economic analysis to its center …. they'll have to do their  
best to incorporate the realities of finance into macroeconomics …. It will be a long time, if  
ever, before the new, more realistic approaches to finance and macroeconomics offer the same 
kind  of  clarity,  completeness  and  sheer  beauty  that  characterizes  the  full  neoclassical 
approach.”
It  may  be  concluded  from  the  intersection  of  these  views  that  neoclassical  economics 
continues to have an important role in policy making. However, policy formation remains a  
rough  and  tumble  area  of  politics.  With  the  evolution  of  monitored  democracies,  policy  
makers need to prepare to be accountable in the future for their current policy decisions, as 
messy as these decisions may be (Keane 2009; Kelly 2010). Therefore policy decisions will 
need to  be documented as evidence driven processes,  notwithstanding that  these processes 
may be undertaken without public scrutiny at the time. While policy makers will not be able 
to  rely  on  simple  neoclassical  economic  prescriptions,  neoclassical  policy  research  will  
remain an essential element of their documented due diligence.
4. General equilibrium in evidence based policy
4.1 Scope of policy research tools
As  human  societies  become  more  organised  and  interdependent,  policy  making  needs  to 
expand from addressing issues in the local region to national policy and global policy. This is  
shown in Figure 5 as a horizontal expansion in policy scope.
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Fig. 5 Policies scope at the industry-region, national and global levels
One methodology rarely encompasses  all  that  needs to  be investigated  in  policy research.  
Usually, the policy issue is deconstructed into smaller, manageable pieces with an appropriate 
tool  chosen for  each research task.  Policy analysis  becomes the insight  developed through  
iteratively using each tool and ensuring consistent answers.
The importance of  historical analysis  in developing evidence for  consistent  and believable 
hypotheses  was  referred to  in  discussing the objective theory of evidence.  It  would  be no  
surprise that a discovery of the historical background through political economy analysis has  
become de rigueur for research in evidence based policy. This includes ideological analysis  
in which conservative, liberal, radical and alternative ideologies are considered. Point of view 
analysis is a similar technique which analyses policies from prominent points of view. This  
needs  to  be  extended  across  the whole  of  the  political,  economic  and social  fabric  of  the 
system in which the tétonnement of marginal social benefit and marginal cost occurs.
The  above  discussion  of  modelling  and  the  “objective  theory  of  evidence”  showed  that 
policies  need  to  be  quantified  using  mathematical  techniques.  These  techniques  include  
empirical  analysis  of  data  using  statistical  methodologies  that  measure  the  impact  of  
government  policy  on  individuals  and  markets,  microeconomic  models  with  indifference 
curve-budget constraint graphs and equilibrium models for constrained utility maximisation;  
and supply and demand diagrams for equilibrium and social welfare efficiency.
Equilibrium modelling has two variants: partial and general equilibrium. Marshall's  famous 
microeconomic scissor curves for supply and demand are the classic representation of partial  
equilibrium  analysis  (Marshall  1890).  Partial  Equilibrium  modelling  focuses  on  a  single 
commodity and assumes  ceteris paribus that the supply and demand curves are independent 
of each other.
Partial  equilibrium models  are  suitable  for  most  regional  analysis.  In  partial  equilibrium 
analysis, major economic parameters such as economic growth are provided exogenously and 
changes  in  resources  are  seen  as  perturbations  to  the  initial  equilibrium.  For  example,  
changes to the demand curve do not affect the supply curve.
Figure  6  shows  that  partial  equilibrium  modelling  has  proven  suitable  for  regional  and  
national  policy  research.  However,  the  effect  of  global  policies  on  national  and  regional  
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industries in the presence of trade flows necessitates general equilibrium techniques.
Fig. 6 Applicability of Partial Equilibrium and General Equilibrium techniques in policy 
research
General equilibrium has the more ambitious goal of finding a commodity market tétonnement 
where partial equilibrium assumptions do not apply. General equilibrium seeks to explain the  
price  and  quantity  effects  of  whole  economies,  which  are  composed  of  many  individual  
commodity markets. As the production of commodities is interlinked and the raw materials of  
each production unit comprise the output commodities of other industries, the demand of the  
downstream industries  is  the derived demand of the upstream industry.  Indeed,  in practice 
many  complex  industrial  feedback  loops  occur.  Furthermore,  if  raw  materials,  labour  or 
capital  are  constrained  then  the  producers  in  each  market  need  to  compete  for  scarce 
resources and bid for raw materials. The  tétonnement of each market is contemporaneously 
settled in concert with all of the other markets. This compound effect accounts for the upward  
sloping supply curve.
Generic general equilibrium models have the same consumer utility and production functions,  
market clearance and resource constraints as partial equilibrium models. The one additional  
feature of a general equilibrium model is an income balance where the prices of commodities  
multiplied by the commodity volumes is equal to (or less than) the prices of the resources 
multiplied  by  the  volumes  of  resources.  In  the  field  of  optimised  market  models  this  
relationship is called the Main Theorem of Linear Programming.
The  analysis  of  national  and  global  affairs  has  increasingly  required  general  equilibrium 
models with bilateral trade to allow countries to change their competitive positions. In such 
models,  changes  to  the demand curves  of  commodities  have  a  major  effect  on  the supply 
curves, and the imports and exports of countries have a major effect on growth rates. As a  
result, growth is output, calculated endogenously, rather than an exogenous input as in partial  
equilibrium.  Most  major  countries  in  the  world  have  developed  models  for  World  Trade 
Organisation,  GATT and  Free  Trade  Agreements,  economic  integration,  taxation  policies, 
public finance, development strategies, energy security and greenhouse gas pollution policies.
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4.2 Computable General Equilibrium tools for policy research
As noted above, government policy makers often look to the political economy of classical  
and  neoclassical  economics  to  help  understand  the  price,  volume  and  spatial  effects  of  
complex  policies.  Computable  General  Equilibrium (CGE)  tools  have  become  one  of  the 
main ways  of evaluating the effect  of global  policy proposals.  As shown in Figure 7,  this  
paradigm  of  developing  spatial  policy  insights  exists  within  an  internally  consistent 
framework of neoclassical economics.  Policy makers draw upon this analytical framework,  
which  rests  within  their  political  economy  and  social  and  market  (or  central  planning) 
assumptions.
Fig. 7 Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Modelling exists within 
the Neoclassical paradigm and within the overall Political Economy
The important caveat, referred to above, is that despite the apparent mathematical beauty of  
neoclassical policy research, these outcomes are never complete and only ever a sensitivity  
scenario in the journey of emulating the complex and changing global marketplace.
4.3 General limitations of CGE tools
We are at a cusp in history that makes innovation in evidence driven policy and computable  
general  equilibrium  for  constrained  resource  development  important  and  timely.  Major  
philosophical,  economic,  behavioural  and  security  changes  are  taking  place  in  Western 
societies. For example, the great Western dreams of expansion and unlimited resources, in the 
past through force of arms if necessary, is evolving to a new type of sustainable dream. New 
regionally disaggregate policy modelling platforms are needed for these emerging times of  
heavily constrained and symbiotic global growth.
Traditional  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  models  are  a  set  of  simultaneous 
equations that can be solved to  calculate  the equilibrium balance of an economy or  set  of  
economies.  These equations that describe the economy,  international trade,  technology and  
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resource constraints of labour, capital and other critical limits. There are four main groups of 
equations: prices and price elasticities,  production and trade,  economic actors (households,  
enterprises, government, and a “rest of the world” institution) and constraints for factors of  
production and commodities that have to be satisfied for the system as a whole.
The use of such models requires many specialist mathematical algorithms. In addition, there  
can be optimisation limitations where economists, engineers and industrial ecologists apply 
constraints to simulate policy options by solving the complex interactions between different  
technological processes and labour markets within constraints.
The  value  of  CGE  models  as  an  internally  consistent  neoclassical  paradigm  has  been 
discussed.  More  specifically,  CGE  quantity  and  price  models  implicitly  assume  that  
democracy and free markets are the best form of social organisation and that at an aggregated 
level  everyone  has  the  same  perception  of  utility in  personal  consumption  and  will  make  
rational  decisions.  This  leads to  one  of  CGE's  major  weaknesses,  that  the construction of  
synthetic market models and the evidence used to do this is embedded with assumptions. This  
is  the same charge  often levelled at  central  planners,  which can never  have sufficient  and 
timely information to make their decisions reliable.
As we have seen in the failures of neoclassical economics, the paradigm may easily be (or  
become) delaminated from reality.  Economics is not a science based on immutable laws. It  
can  only  ever  be  a  consistent  discipline  of  practice  with  working  assumptions  that  have  
proven generally valid  in the past.  However,  the past  is not always a reliable guide to the  
future  (Popper 1959).  Quite  often assumptions become invalid and sometimes the body of  
policy makers doesn't notice this happening. At this point the paradigm diverges from reality.  
America's  financial  crisis showed that neither individual  nor collective behaviour could be  
reliably predicted  by  sets  of  equations.  Markets  are  subject  to  failure  due  to  behavioural  
factors such as the breakdown of enlightened self interest, which is an article of faith in the  
dogma of self-regulation, and not being fully accountable for the outcome of one's actions,  
which is called “moral hazard.”
One  of  the  reasons  that  traditional  CGE  modelling  delaminates  from  reality  is  that  its  
assumptions  about  utility  and  welfare  maximisation,  measured  by  the  expansion  of 
consumption,  are  rationalist  generalisations.  At  times  when  individuals  and,  even  more 
importantly,  institutional stakeholders  behave in different ways then these assumptions can  
become  unjustified.  Any  numerical  policy  research  needs  to  be  supplemented  with  an 
understanding of the values and ideas, alliances, brokerage and compromise of the strongly 
competing stakeholder institutions that have large resources to influence policy outcomes. It  
is  necessary to evaluate the same policies with reference to the tools of political  economy,  
ideology, moral philosophy and influence analysis as Lorman & Van Groningen (2009) note: 
“This  capacity to  engage  and shape  arrangements  is  greatly  influenced by their  command 
over resources. Those with the greatest command over resources have the greatest potential to 
influence policy outcomes.”
Those who criticise the paradigm of consumption growth are equally scathing of CGE models  
as being tools of a “cult of growth” that conveniently justify growth policies  (Lowe 2009). 
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However, this criticism of neoclassical economics and CGE models may be largely misplaced  
because constraints on resource usage from natural endowment scarcity and specific policy 
implementation (for example, to control emissions) means that the dual solution provides the  
very  efficiency  in  resource  utilisation  that  policy  makers  seek  when  putting  a  price  on  
resources.  The  value  of  CGE policy  tools  is  in  showing  that  restructuring  societies  from 
unconstrained growth to constrained growth can achieve the necessary auto-stabilising goals  
through democratic and market means rather than through quantitative regulation and central  
planning mechanisms.
5. Policy Research Process
The  traditional  process  for  policy  making  is  to  set  the  agenda;  formulate  policy options;  
select  policy instrument;  implement;  monitor;  evaluate;  review; and terminate  (Sutcliffe  & 
Court 2005, p.9; Lorman & Van Groningen 2009; Young & Quinn 2002, pp.13-4) . 
Figure 7 (above) showed how policy making occurs within the complex social environment  
formed  by  prevailing  economic  and  political  philosophies  and  a  suite  of  influential  
institutions.  The  foregoing  discussion  has  shown  that  evidence  driven  policy  is  itself  a  
function  of  political  economy  and  the  acquiescence,  or  not,  of  policy  makers  to  such  a  
transparent process. However, it appears that policy makers have increasingly more onerous  
responsibility  to  demonstrate  their  accountability  for  policy  making  as  Western  societies 
continue evolving to monitored democracies. In turn, this can be expected to lead to the more  
frequent use of evidence driven policy techniques.
Evidence  driven  policy  has  obvious  application  in  clinical  testing  and  other  scientific  
experiments where the deductive theory of falsification holds. It also has significant benefit  
in other areas of society where the scenarios are less experimentally clear and the objective  
theory of evidence holds. For example, in policy areas such as economics, health, education,  
law and defence where a great number of dependencies exist,  variables can rarely be held  
constant  ceteris paribus as is done in controlled scientific experiments, and the effluxion of 
short periods of time inevitably brings additional changes to the basis of the policy research.
From the above discussion it  may be appreciated that a  key requirement  in  the process  of  
evidence-based policy is for due diligence research and debate to maximise the probability  
that a proposed policy is both feasible and the best policy. In this regard, consistency of the  
evidence is extremely important. For example, developing a historical analysis of the political  
economy of the policy area along with economic modelling for future scenarios of the policy.
This can be generalised into a framework for policy research, occurring within a process of  
evidence driven policy, as shown Figure 8.
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Fig. 8 Evidence Driven Policy
The first phases of “Policy Issue” and “Policy Design” are where policy makers identify the  
key  issue  and  design  hypothetical  policies,  interventions  and  instruments.  This  phase  of 
setting  the  agenda  seeks  to  identify  the  reasons  why  the  issue  is  important,  competing  
definitions of the problem, potential policy instruments; the steps ahead; and the power blocs  
and the stakeholder engagement required for alliances, brokerage and compromise.
Computable  General  Equilibrium  policy  tools  find  their  place  in  the  second  stage  of  the 
policy forming process, namely,  “Policy Research”. In this phase, hypothetical policies are 
submitted to testing. Additional iterative research is undertaken to establish what needs to be  
done; identify a range of potential intervention responses; potential instruments; institutions 
that will  implement the policy; identify individuals, institutions, industries and regions that  
will be affected; and to provide information to help achieve stakeholder institutions support.
The vast number of policy instruments required for the fine tuning of policy implementation  
means that high level policy research tools such as CGE models need to be carefully finessed  
and the risks documented carefully.
5.5 Policy risks
There are two types of risk: the systemic risk of being unable to fully represent the real world  
in  a  model;  and  non-systemic  or  ordinary  uncertainties  associated  with  the  economic  
environment.
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5.5.1 Systemic modelling risks
As for all professionals, policy modellers' prima facie duties include integrity, objectivity, an 
absence of any conflict of interest,  possession of the necessary skills and competence,  and 
processes for care and due diligence. The duty of care includes an appreciation of misleading  
(or deceptive) assumptions, including misleading by omission.
Wise hands in policy formation recognise first and foremost that any projection or forecast is  
a  matter  of  opinion  and  judgement.  Instead  of  seeking  a  specific  numerical  result,  policy 
makers look for reasoned and sustainable assumptions and a systematic modelling process.  
For their part, those preparing the model specification need to appreciate that their audience's  
understanding of the assumptions is essential for their proper assessment of the information 
contained in the model. Therefore, specialists and experts preparing models need to take as  
much care with the formation and publication of the assumptions as they do with the policy  
research results.
5.5.2 Non-systemic modelling risks
As there is little practical certainty to be found in any single-point or stand-alone scenario,  
there is no point looking to one or other scenario as an immutable outcome. Nevertheless,  
there  is  considerable  value  in  understanding the  differences  between scenarios  in  order  to  
develop  a  feel  for  the  patina  of  intensity  in  economic  responses  to  policy.  This  can  be  
achieved  with  a  narrow  range  of  scenarios  that  highlight  risks  while  avoiding  the  
meaninglessness of a range of scenarios that is either too wide or narrow.
5.5.3 Communication risks
Due to a pervasive human behavioural fallibility, many people act on the assumption that the 
middle value of a table or range is the most likely value. As a result, the way results are read  
by the  intended  audience  is  also  important  and  measures  need  to  be  taken  to  ensure  the  
presentation of results  is  not  misleading.   Rather  than extensive  tables,  the most  probable  
outcomes and variables that have a significant impact on these results can be discussed.
5.6. Public exposure of policy
A number of the components of Figure 8 relate to public input in the policy making process.  
As  the  great  deductivists  like  Popper  and  Kuhn  surmised,  exposure  of  expertly  prepared 
evidence-based research to peer review and, ultimately, to an open and transparent process of 
public criticism provides a fiery proving ground for assuring that a proposed policy is both 
feasible and the best policy. In particular, it is often only at the stage of public exposure that 
issues of social equity and justice are appropriately weighed, for example, doing the most for  
the  majority  while  at  the  same  time  looking  after  the  least  well  off  as  argued  by Rawls  
(1972).
Prior to public exposure, the process of developing expert opinion for evidence-based policy  
usually relies on normative principles of systematic practice in the respective profession, be it 
economics, law, engineering or another profession. Ironically, while systematically applying  
inductivism  throughout  evidence-based  policy,  enlightened  professional  practice  complies  
with  strict  deductivist  principles  in  claiming  only  to  represent  current  best  working  
hypotheses  and  shunning  any  ambit  that  these  professional  hypotheses  be  regarded  as  a  
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science of theories and laws.
Lastly, evidence based policy is always at risk of being subverted and the “policy makers for  
policy  making”  need  to  be  ever  vigilant  of  degenerate  policy  driven  evidence  replacing  
evidence  driven  policy).  This  is  selective  or  manipulated  evidence  provided  to  justify  or  
promote a particular policy. For example, Thomas Kuhn showed in The Structure of Scientific  
Revolutions (1962) that  vested  interest  groups will  invest  large  resources in  defending the 
status  quo.  Bryson  & Mobray  (2005) highlight  the  need  for  high  level  impartiality  and  a 
passion for diligent governance to eliminate conflicts of interest.
7. Conclusion
This  paper  addresses evidence driven policy making,  which is an increasingly used policy 
response to complex multidisciplinary issues in policy and strategy. The world's biggest such 
process has been used to illustrate many controversies associated with this technique. This is  
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) development of  
policy to deal with global warming.
Foundations for evidence driven policy in Service Science game theory trust strategies and  
the  evolution  of  Western  societies  toward  monitored  democracies  were  identified.  The 
influence of two deductivist approaches to policy in the evolution of society, those of Sir Karl  
Popper and Thomas Kuhn, were investigated. It was shown that deductivism and falsification  
are widely accepted as the best approaches to scientific progress and the more open a society 
or  business  is  then  the  more  successful  it  may be.  However,  in  practice  these  cannot  be 
applied  to  social  issues  or  are  in  general  too  disciplined  for  human  beings,  who  are  not  
exclusively rational beings.
A viable  albeit  controversial  complement  to  deduction  was  identified,  which  is  evidence 
based induction. The objective theory of evidence was developed from Popper's World III of  
objective knowledge. In order for evidence-based processes to be valid and form a practical  
working hypothesis or normative theory,  the evidence must be highly consistent. In  policy,  
the evidence needs to derive from and be part of a consistent body of political economy. It  
was  shown  that  Bayesian  inductive  inference  provides  the  mathematical  foundation  for  
evidence based induction and the objective theory of evidence. It  was also argued that this  
provides the understanding of why policy makers submit their draft  policies for  feasibility  
evaluation.
It  was shown that conservative and liberal political perspectives have a major influence on 
the policy making process, with liberals favouring evidence driven policy and conservatives  
often prepared to be more expedient. It was also shown that political conservatives need to be  
vigilant of their paradigm's vulnerability to degenerative psychopathic behaviour.
The identification of conservative politics with climate scepticism in Western societies such  
as  America  and  Australia  was  contrasted  to  the  absence  of  this  congruity in  conservative 
European politics.  It  was shown that  the Copenhagen embarrassments  for  evidence  driven  
policy were but a hiatus and that the compelling outcomes from the evidence driven policy 
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processes have brought the U.S. Senate to the cusp of accepting America's future growth will  
be subject to constrained resources of the global commons.
Neoclassical economics provides the body of consistency for policy makers that is so much a  
part of the objective theory of evidence and evidence driven policy. For this reason, there is  
considerable poignancy in the controversy that neoclassical  economics was neither able to 
predict nor solve the 2009 Global Financial Crisis. It  was shown that a key reason for this  
failure  was  that  neoclassical  policy  and  models  placed  insufficient  importance  on  debt 
neutrality and closing policy and models for households and socio-economic groups.
Challenges to  the neoclassical  paradigm have been investigated  and it  was  concluded that  
neoclassical economics continues to have an important role in the consistency of evidence  
driven  policy.  However,  the  lesson  of  the  Global  Financial  Crisis  is  that  neoclassical 
economics  is  not  prescriptive  but  illustrative.  Policy  makers  have  no  easy  mathematical  
solutions  and  continue  to  be  faced  with  the  inescapable  feature  of  their  art  being  its  
messiness.
The  role  of  policy  research  tools  within  evidence  driven  policy  was  investigated.  
Computable  General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  was  shown  to  find  its  role  in  policies  where  
countries are linked by trade. However, it was shown that in using CGE tools it is important  
to be cognisant of the great weaknesses, as well  as the great strengths, that derive from its 
neoclassical heritage.
The  above  conclusions  were  used  to  construct  a  generic  policy  research  process  placing 
emphasis  on  the  consistency  of  political  economy,  neoclassical  economics,  Computable  
General  Equilibrium Policy  tools,  systemic  and  non-systemic  policy  modelling  risks,  and 
public exposure of policy during and subsequent to policy research.
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The use of Computable General Equilibrium
modelling in evidence-based policy requires an
advanced policy making frame of reference,
advanced understanding of neoclassical economics
and advanced operations research capabilities.
This paper examines developments in the policy
making frame of reference. The process of
evidence-driven policy places importance on the
validation of potential policies using models. At
national, bilateral and multilateral levels, policy
analysis has increasing relied on neoclassical
computable general equilibrium models having
substantial precedence. Bayesian analysis
suggests that a policy which survives a validation
test using such a model has a much better chance
of being successful than a policy that fails such a
test. Yet the 2008-9 Global Financial Crisis
demonstrated that policies verified with
neoclassical models neither predicted the Global
Financial Crisis nor were able to address it.
Governments across the world used massive
Keynesian stimulus to restabilise economies.
Neoclassical models became much maligned within
Keynesian and behavioural economics circles. This
paper investigates the continuing role of
neoclassical models in evidence-driven policy with
reference to the deductivism of Sir Karl Popper and
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Thomas Kuhn, inductivism and the controversial
objective theory of evidence. While policy making
has always been messy, in recent decades policy
makers may have succumbed to the human
fallibility of justifying pragmatism with simplified
ideological paradigms that inappropriately place
over-reliance on neoclassical free market
mathematical models because these models are
self-reinforcing of the ideology. It is suggested that
future policy making will be even messier, with
policy makers placing less importance on such
simplified paradigms and taking more responsibility
for managing plurality in the political process. It is
concluded that neoclassical models will continue to
have a role in testing policies but those features of
neoclassical models that led to the failures in
understanding the Global Financial Crisis will need
to be addressed. For example, to be relevant such
models will need to close for both households and
investment and be cognisant of distributional
effects such as the sweep of income to the top 5%
of consumers through wage and taxation policies.
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08:30 - 09:00  Late registrations only
09:00 - 09:30  Opening Ceremony and Welcome to Country
Eastern Avenue Lecture Theatre
Geoffrey J. D. Hewings (President of the IIOA),
José M. Rueda-Cantuche (Chair of the SPC),
Klaus Hubacek (Co-chair of the SPC),
Manfred Lenzen (Chair of the LOC),
Jodie González Jennings (Co-chair of the LOC)
09:30 - 10:30  Plenary Session 1
• Location: Eastern Avenue Lecture Theatre
Topic: Sustainability in Economics
Chair: Joerg Beutel
1. Is there entropy in an economy? Revisiting an early concept of sustainability introduced by Nicholas
Georgescu-Roegen
by Utz Peter Reich
10:30 - 11:00  Coffee Break 
11:00 - 12:30  Parallel Session 1
• Location: Eastern Avenue Lecture Theatre
Topic: World Input-Output Database I: Contruction issues
Chair: Erik Dietzenbacher
1. Joint Estimation of Supply and Use Tables
by Umed Temurshoev, Marcel P. Timmer
2. An Empirical Evaluation of Methods to Estimate Use Tables of Imports
by Bart Los
3. The construction of input-output tables and the use of supply-use tables in input-output analyses: a review
by José Manuel Rueda-Cantuche, Joerg Beutel
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